By Zalmay Khalilzad
Mar 19, 2012
A better way to conceptualize the Pakistani challenge is to recognize that Pakistan fits into a category of states that are both things at once: ally and adversary. The national interests of these states, as defined by key elites and policymakers, are consistent with some U.S. goals but opposed to others. Conceptions of the national interest may differ between competing institutions within the state. The policies they pursue are malleable to varying degrees, and the extent to which they support or oppose the United States can vary by issues and the circumstances. Unlike genuine allies, the United States shares with these states only some common interests and only limited strategic like-mindedness. Their goals, outlooks, and policies often come into conflict. Such states have incentives to cooperate with the United States—at least on a tactical level—on some issues. But the relationship is not founded on a clear and genuine basis of understanding, and relations can degenerate into periods of tension or crisis.
Pakistan fits neatly into this category of states. On a spectrum of allies and adversaries, Pakistan falls somewhere in the middle, alongside states such as China and Russia. In such cases, the key to developing an effective U.S. strategy is to understand the motivations informing the conduct of these states. Pakistan’s strategic motivations are shaped in large part by its fragmented polity and the parochial outlook and interests of its military institutions. Pakistan sees violent extremist groups as vital instruments of an ambitious imperial policy. Perpetuating a climate of insecurity allows the military to justify its disproportionate claim on national resources.
Engagement alone has proven insufficient to alter Pakistan’s strategic calculus. Accordingly, the United States should shift to a new paradigm of “congagement,” applying a mixed arsenal of methods to contain Pakistan’s dangerous and destabilizing policies but also to engage Islamabad to sustain existing cooperation and incentivize it to move toward more.
Source: https://csis.org/publication/twq-strategy-congagement-toward-pakistan-spring-2012